Any arbitration practitioner always bears in mind a truism that a high-quality arbitration is a result of “joinder” of (a) fairness and professionalism of parties (their counsels), on the one hand, and (b) diligence, expertise, independence and impartiality of arbitrator(s), on another.
In fact, both (i) parties standing before a choice of appointing or challenging an arbitrator and (ii) arbitrator analyzing his or her status in order to accept or decline an appointment are puzzled when it comes to the process of defining the exact scope and limits of impartiality and independence. These two principles are interrelated and always “holding hands” of each another, but their concepts are distinct and must be clearly understood by all the participants involved in the arbitration. Thus, while deciding on arbitrator’s appointment or accepting party’s appointment, both a party (counsel) and a prospective arbitrator had to pass through the “Valley of Ambiguity” in the above concepts.
Below the authors will touch upon such important issues as the arbitrator’s independence and impartiality being the cornerstone principles of international arbitration.
Independence vs. Impartiality: battle of concepts!
In practice notions of independence and impartiality are often used interchangeably with no clear distinction in their scope and limits. Therefore, prior to apply them, it is essential to draw a strict line between independence and impartiality, which is not an easy task.
Independence means absence of any dependent (actual or past) relationship between the prospective arbitrator and the party nominating him/her as well as absence of any joint interest between them which might give rise to a legitimate doubt as to existence of any complicity or appears to affect the arbitrator’s freedom of judgment [1]. Arbitrator’s independence may be questioned when the latter has personal, family, professional or business connection with one of the parties (including theirs counsels). As an example, personal arbitrator’s connections may include not only occasional communication between the appointing party and an arbitrator, but also connections of partners and associates of such arbitrator’s law firm with the appointing party.
Contrary to the above, impartiality is a subjective concept, which relates to a state of mind being extremely difficult to ascertain when appointing an arbitrator and means an absence of actual or apparent bias of an arbitrator either in favor of one of the parties or in relation to the issues in dispute [2]. Impartiality is an attitude issue, a kind of arbitrator’s state of mind which reflects presence or absence of prejudice towards the outcome of the arbitration procedure, often pointing on a personal material interest of the arbitrator in the merits of the case. The arbitrator’s bias may arise during the course of arbitration and thus, is not always connected with the pre-conceive influence of personal, family, professional or business character.
But, notwithstanding the above approaches on independence’s and impartiality’s concepts are carefully developed by the doctrine of international arbitration, in practice the uniform interpretation is absent. Therefore, to clarify this issue the arbitration acts, rules and standards should be examined.
Application of Concepts: the way it is!
In fact, the principles of independence and impartiality are embodied in almost all the national legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration [3]. Certainly, there is some textual discrepancy, but, in general, the provisions on arbitrator’s independence and impartiality are drafted in the same manner providing for a duty of disclosure by a prospective arbitrator and a party’s ability to challenge an arbitrator if there are “any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence” [4]. In contrast the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides for the duty of the arbitration of the tribunal to ‘‘act fairly and impartially as between the parties’’ [5], but is silent as to requirement to act independently. Also under Section 24 the English Arbitration Act an arbitrator may be removed on the grounds of lack of impartiality or failure to conduct the proceedings properly.
However, though both independence and impartiality are mentioned in almost all existing arbitration national laws and rules, the latter is not very helpful with clarifying definition or an interpretation of the underlying principles of arbitration and qualifying the conduct as “dependent and partial”, like if it goes without saying.
For instance, the Rules of the ICAC at UCCI [6] provide for the parties’ ability to “challenge an arbitrator if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his [or her] impartiality or independence…” [7]. The LCIA Rules require an arbitrator not only to ‘‘remain at all times impartial and independent of the parties’’ [8], but also to sign a written declaration to the effect that there are no circumstances known to arbitrator which likely to give rise to any justified doubts as to his impartiality and independence. [9]
The new 2012 ICC Rules of Arbitration [10] provide for the requirements towards arbitrators (a) to be “impartial and independent of the parties involved in the arbitration’’ [11], (b) to “sign a statement of acceptance, availability, impartiality and independence” [12] and (c) to disclose all facts which may give rise to doubt on his independent status to ‘‘act fairly and impartially’’. But still no detailed answer as to definition and interpretation of those principles is provided.
In view of the above regulatory vacuum, what are the criteria to be followed by the parties while deciding on nomination?
Independent Standards: not a nostrum, but a guidance!
The most successful and circulated document providing for a key to puzzle for understanding the importance of independence and impartiality is the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (hereinafter – “IBA Guidelines”) [13]. It is a well-structured result of deep analysis effectuated by the IBA Working Group in 2004 and may serve an A-B-C book for the arbitration proceedings’ actors trapped by the challenge of appointing a prospective arbitrator or being appointed as such.
The data contained in the IBA Guidelines is compiled in a list of illustrative scenarios or “situations” sorted by the “danger’s colour” which depends on types and levels of interconnections between an arbitrator and a party.
The IBA Guidelines provides for three well-known lists:
(i) Red List is subdivided into situations that cannot be waived by the parties (“non-waivable” part) and those that can be waived (“waivable” part). The non-waivable part provides for most serious types of conflicts, when there is a distinct relational identity between the arbitrator and a party appointing him/her or when the arbitrator has a “significant” interest in that party. The “waivable” part enumerates the situations in which an arbitrator was previously involved in a dispute, or close family friends of the arbitrator have a financial interest in the dispute, or the arbitrator has a relationship with a party or a party's counsel. [14]
(ii) Orange List is composed of specific scenarios in which the parties have reasonable doubts about the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, among others: when arbitrator served as counsel “within the past three years” or his/her law firm provided services to a party; direct/indirect relationships between arbitrators or between an arbitrator and counsel in an arbitration; when an arbitrator has a “material shareholding” in a party or its affiliate; and situations in which an arbitrator takes a public position on a matter that is in dispute, etc. [15]
(iii) Green List consists of situations in which there is no partiality or a lack of independence. [16]
The IBA Guidelines are not of mandatory character and do not “override any applicable national law or arbitral rules chosen by the parties” [17], but they are commonly used by the arbitration practitioners, the arbitral tribunals and national courts in order to interpret the impartiality and independence standards, even in situations when the parties to a dispute did not expressly provided for their application.
For example, in the high-profile (at least for Ukrainian practitioners) ICSID case Alpha Projectholding GmbH v. Ukraine No. ARB/07/16 the Respondent (Ukraine) sought for the disqualification of an arbitrator claiming that the latter studied at Harvard Law School with Claimant’s counsel, but not disclosed that fact in his declaration. The tribunal rejected such challenge stipulating that the Respondent did not provide the objective evidence of the fact that the arbitrator was not a person of “high moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment”, that is required by paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the ICSID Convention. It is noteworthy that in the cited Decision on Proposal for Disqualification of an Arbitrator [18] the ICSID tribunal applied for the IBA Guidelines by stating that they represent “a catalogue of the bases for challenge as well as for parameters of an arbitrator’s duty to disclosure”, and thus, literally recognizing them as an international standard for disclosure by arbitrators, irrespective of the absence of the mutual agreement of the parties for the application thereof.
In case No. T 156-09 (Korsnäs AB v. AB Fortum Värme samägt med Stockholms stad) the Supreme Court of Sweden considered the dispute on disqualification of a party-appointed arbitrator based on repeated appointment [19] of that arbitrator by the counsel for the respondent. Notably, that apart from sources of law both the Swedish Supreme Court and Svea Court of Appeal, as first instance, referred to the IBA Guidelines, though their application was not in fact agreed by the parties. In particular, the Svea Court of Appeal stated in its reasons that the IBA Guidelines, as well as other domestic and international arbitration rules, “serve as important guidelines for counsel and arbitrators and also have some relevance as background material when the Court of Appeal now is trying the case applying the provisions of the Arbitration Act.” [20]
By its ruling in Case No. T 10321-06 dated 10 December 2008 the Svea Court of Appeal rejected the challenge and referring to Section 3.3.7 of the IBA Guidelines [21] held that “since the IBA Guidelines provides that an arbitrator during the given period has to have been appointed more than three times, i.e. at least four times, by the same counsel or law firm to be considered not impartial, [the abritrator] cannot with reference to these rules be considered prevented from serving as an arbitrator in the arbitration between Korsnäs and Fortum” [22]. In its ruling dated 9 June 2010 [23], the Swedish Supreme Court upheld the above reasons and ruling of the Svea Court of Appeal, but also pointed out that frequent appointments by the same law firm is a circumstance that may diminish confidence in the arbitrator's impartiality, but arbitrator’s failure to disclose such circumstances does not itself constituted a bias and is not an independent ground for setting aside, but such failure could be taken into account in doubtful cases.
In this regard, it is also remarkable that the Chamber of Commerce of Russian Federation has recently developed and approved its Rules on Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators [24]. Though, these Rules are not legal provisions of binding character, they represent per se guidance for identifying the “partial and somehow dependent” arbitrator and are recommended for application by the authorized body deciding the challenges issues and the national courts resolving the setting aside and enforcement issues.
Final Impartial Remarks: where do these principles lead?
The arbitrator’s impartiality and independence are not “water under the bridge”, they do play a significant role in the arbitration. These requirements should be carefully observed by both parties, while implementing their freedom to choose an arbitrator, and arbitrators, while considering the potential appointment and signing a statement of impartiality and independence.
While making a quick choice in appointing an arbitrator usually without a careful consideration of possible risks of “partiality and dependence” the parties are not aware of an imminent danger they are in. Furthermore, as it is not rarely occurred, while appointing a prospective arbitrator a party often tends to appoint a candidate who will be favorable to him and, at the same time, a party-appointed arbitrator tends to favor its appointing party to “ensure” further appointments. Such a practice may dramatically endanger the effectiveness of the whole arbitration process.
So, undervalue or non-observance of the above principles may lead to either (i) challenge of the arbitrator and/or (ii) in lots of jurisdictions may even lead to the denial in recognition and enforcement or setting aside of the award resulted of the above “favoring” practice.
Therefore, it would be recommended to observe and follow the above arbitration principles and international standards in order to prevent loosing your way in the successful and fair arbitration.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Jean-Louis Delvolvé, Jean Rouche, Gerald H. Pointon, French Arbitration Law and Practice: a dynamic civil law approach to international arbitration. - Kluwer Law International, 2009 – p.p. 97-98 (para. 182) ; Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis, Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration. - Kluwer Law International, 2003 – p. 261 (para. 11-19).
[2] Alan Redfern, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Sweet and Maxwell, 2004. - p. 201 (para. 4-55); J.C. Fernández Rozas, Clearer Ethics Guidelines and Comparative Standards for Arbitrators, Liber Amicorum Bernardo Cremades, Madrid, La Ley, 2010. – p.p. 413-449
[3] Among others, the Act of Ukraine On International Commercial Arbitration;
[4] Article 12 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.
[5] Section 33 of the English Arbitration Act
[6] The 2007 Rules of the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which are based on the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
[7] Article 30 (1) of the Rules of the ICAC at UCCI.
[8] Article 5 (2) of the 1998 Rules of London Court of International Arbitration.
[9] Article 5 (3) of the LCIA Rules (1998).
[10] The new ICC Rules of Arbitration will come into effect since 1 January 2012.
[11] Article 11(1) of the ICC Rules (2012).
[12] Article 2 (5) of the ICC Rules (2012).
[13] Approved on 22 May 2004 by the Council of the International Bar Association (IBA), the world’s leading organization of international legal practitioners.
[14] The IBA Guidelines 2004, Part II, Lists, paras 1-2.
[15] The IBA Guidelines 2004, Part II, Lists, para 3.
[16] The IBA Guidelines 2004, Part II, Lists, para 4.
[17] The IBA Guidelines 2004, Part I, para 6.
[18] Dated 19 March 2010.
[19] The arbitrator was appointed by the law firm-counsel for the respondent on two other occasions within three-year period.
[20] Niklas Lindström, Challenges to Arbitrators - Decisions by the SCC Board during 2008 – 2010 – p.3 // available here
[21] In particular, Paragraph 3.3.7 of the IBA Guidelines (Orange List) provides that more than three appointments of the arbitrator by the same counsel or law firm constitute a relationship between such arbitrator and counsel.
[22] Niklas Lindström, Challenges to Arbitrators - Decisions by the SCC Board during 2008 – 2010 – p. 3
[23] Available here
[24] Approved by the Order of the President of the Chamber of Commerce of Russian Federation No. 39 dated 27 August 2010
In fact, both (i) parties standing before a choice of appointing or challenging an arbitrator and (ii) arbitrator analyzing his or her status in order to accept or decline an appointment are puzzled when it comes to the process of defining the exact scope and limits of impartiality and independence. These two principles are interrelated and always “holding hands” of each another, but their concepts are distinct and must be clearly understood by all the participants involved in the arbitration. Thus, while deciding on arbitrator’s appointment or accepting party’s appointment, both a party (counsel) and a prospective arbitrator had to pass through the “Valley of Ambiguity” in the above concepts.
Below the authors will touch upon such important issues as the arbitrator’s independence and impartiality being the cornerstone principles of international arbitration.
Independence vs. Impartiality: battle of concepts!
In practice notions of independence and impartiality are often used interchangeably with no clear distinction in their scope and limits. Therefore, prior to apply them, it is essential to draw a strict line between independence and impartiality, which is not an easy task.
Independence means absence of any dependent (actual or past) relationship between the prospective arbitrator and the party nominating him/her as well as absence of any joint interest between them which might give rise to a legitimate doubt as to existence of any complicity or appears to affect the arbitrator’s freedom of judgment [1]. Arbitrator’s independence may be questioned when the latter has personal, family, professional or business connection with one of the parties (including theirs counsels). As an example, personal arbitrator’s connections may include not only occasional communication between the appointing party and an arbitrator, but also connections of partners and associates of such arbitrator’s law firm with the appointing party.
Contrary to the above, impartiality is a subjective concept, which relates to a state of mind being extremely difficult to ascertain when appointing an arbitrator and means an absence of actual or apparent bias of an arbitrator either in favor of one of the parties or in relation to the issues in dispute [2]. Impartiality is an attitude issue, a kind of arbitrator’s state of mind which reflects presence or absence of prejudice towards the outcome of the arbitration procedure, often pointing on a personal material interest of the arbitrator in the merits of the case. The arbitrator’s bias may arise during the course of arbitration and thus, is not always connected with the pre-conceive influence of personal, family, professional or business character.
But, notwithstanding the above approaches on independence’s and impartiality’s concepts are carefully developed by the doctrine of international arbitration, in practice the uniform interpretation is absent. Therefore, to clarify this issue the arbitration acts, rules and standards should be examined.
Application of Concepts: the way it is!
In fact, the principles of independence and impartiality are embodied in almost all the national legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration [3]. Certainly, there is some textual discrepancy, but, in general, the provisions on arbitrator’s independence and impartiality are drafted in the same manner providing for a duty of disclosure by a prospective arbitrator and a party’s ability to challenge an arbitrator if there are “any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence” [4]. In contrast the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides for the duty of the arbitration of the tribunal to ‘‘act fairly and impartially as between the parties’’ [5], but is silent as to requirement to act independently. Also under Section 24 the English Arbitration Act an arbitrator may be removed on the grounds of lack of impartiality or failure to conduct the proceedings properly.
However, though both independence and impartiality are mentioned in almost all existing arbitration national laws and rules, the latter is not very helpful with clarifying definition or an interpretation of the underlying principles of arbitration and qualifying the conduct as “dependent and partial”, like if it goes without saying.
For instance, the Rules of the ICAC at UCCI [6] provide for the parties’ ability to “challenge an arbitrator if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his [or her] impartiality or independence…” [7]. The LCIA Rules require an arbitrator not only to ‘‘remain at all times impartial and independent of the parties’’ [8], but also to sign a written declaration to the effect that there are no circumstances known to arbitrator which likely to give rise to any justified doubts as to his impartiality and independence. [9]
The new 2012 ICC Rules of Arbitration [10] provide for the requirements towards arbitrators (a) to be “impartial and independent of the parties involved in the arbitration’’ [11], (b) to “sign a statement of acceptance, availability, impartiality and independence” [12] and (c) to disclose all facts which may give rise to doubt on his independent status to ‘‘act fairly and impartially’’. But still no detailed answer as to definition and interpretation of those principles is provided.
In view of the above regulatory vacuum, what are the criteria to be followed by the parties while deciding on nomination?
Independent Standards: not a nostrum, but a guidance!
The most successful and circulated document providing for a key to puzzle for understanding the importance of independence and impartiality is the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (hereinafter – “IBA Guidelines”) [13]. It is a well-structured result of deep analysis effectuated by the IBA Working Group in 2004 and may serve an A-B-C book for the arbitration proceedings’ actors trapped by the challenge of appointing a prospective arbitrator or being appointed as such.
The data contained in the IBA Guidelines is compiled in a list of illustrative scenarios or “situations” sorted by the “danger’s colour” which depends on types and levels of interconnections between an arbitrator and a party.
The IBA Guidelines provides for three well-known lists:
(i) Red List is subdivided into situations that cannot be waived by the parties (“non-waivable” part) and those that can be waived (“waivable” part). The non-waivable part provides for most serious types of conflicts, when there is a distinct relational identity between the arbitrator and a party appointing him/her or when the arbitrator has a “significant” interest in that party. The “waivable” part enumerates the situations in which an arbitrator was previously involved in a dispute, or close family friends of the arbitrator have a financial interest in the dispute, or the arbitrator has a relationship with a party or a party's counsel. [14]
(ii) Orange List is composed of specific scenarios in which the parties have reasonable doubts about the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, among others: when arbitrator served as counsel “within the past three years” or his/her law firm provided services to a party; direct/indirect relationships between arbitrators or between an arbitrator and counsel in an arbitration; when an arbitrator has a “material shareholding” in a party or its affiliate; and situations in which an arbitrator takes a public position on a matter that is in dispute, etc. [15]
(iii) Green List consists of situations in which there is no partiality or a lack of independence. [16]
The IBA Guidelines are not of mandatory character and do not “override any applicable national law or arbitral rules chosen by the parties” [17], but they are commonly used by the arbitration practitioners, the arbitral tribunals and national courts in order to interpret the impartiality and independence standards, even in situations when the parties to a dispute did not expressly provided for their application.
For example, in the high-profile (at least for Ukrainian practitioners) ICSID case Alpha Projectholding GmbH v. Ukraine No. ARB/07/16 the Respondent (Ukraine) sought for the disqualification of an arbitrator claiming that the latter studied at Harvard Law School with Claimant’s counsel, but not disclosed that fact in his declaration. The tribunal rejected such challenge stipulating that the Respondent did not provide the objective evidence of the fact that the arbitrator was not a person of “high moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment”, that is required by paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the ICSID Convention. It is noteworthy that in the cited Decision on Proposal for Disqualification of an Arbitrator [18] the ICSID tribunal applied for the IBA Guidelines by stating that they represent “a catalogue of the bases for challenge as well as for parameters of an arbitrator’s duty to disclosure”, and thus, literally recognizing them as an international standard for disclosure by arbitrators, irrespective of the absence of the mutual agreement of the parties for the application thereof.
In case No. T 156-09 (Korsnäs AB v. AB Fortum Värme samägt med Stockholms stad) the Supreme Court of Sweden considered the dispute on disqualification of a party-appointed arbitrator based on repeated appointment [19] of that arbitrator by the counsel for the respondent. Notably, that apart from sources of law both the Swedish Supreme Court and Svea Court of Appeal, as first instance, referred to the IBA Guidelines, though their application was not in fact agreed by the parties. In particular, the Svea Court of Appeal stated in its reasons that the IBA Guidelines, as well as other domestic and international arbitration rules, “serve as important guidelines for counsel and arbitrators and also have some relevance as background material when the Court of Appeal now is trying the case applying the provisions of the Arbitration Act.” [20]
By its ruling in Case No. T 10321-06 dated 10 December 2008 the Svea Court of Appeal rejected the challenge and referring to Section 3.3.7 of the IBA Guidelines [21] held that “since the IBA Guidelines provides that an arbitrator during the given period has to have been appointed more than three times, i.e. at least four times, by the same counsel or law firm to be considered not impartial, [the abritrator] cannot with reference to these rules be considered prevented from serving as an arbitrator in the arbitration between Korsnäs and Fortum” [22]. In its ruling dated 9 June 2010 [23], the Swedish Supreme Court upheld the above reasons and ruling of the Svea Court of Appeal, but also pointed out that frequent appointments by the same law firm is a circumstance that may diminish confidence in the arbitrator's impartiality, but arbitrator’s failure to disclose such circumstances does not itself constituted a bias and is not an independent ground for setting aside, but such failure could be taken into account in doubtful cases.
In this regard, it is also remarkable that the Chamber of Commerce of Russian Federation has recently developed and approved its Rules on Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators [24]. Though, these Rules are not legal provisions of binding character, they represent per se guidance for identifying the “partial and somehow dependent” arbitrator and are recommended for application by the authorized body deciding the challenges issues and the national courts resolving the setting aside and enforcement issues.
Final Impartial Remarks: where do these principles lead?
The arbitrator’s impartiality and independence are not “water under the bridge”, they do play a significant role in the arbitration. These requirements should be carefully observed by both parties, while implementing their freedom to choose an arbitrator, and arbitrators, while considering the potential appointment and signing a statement of impartiality and independence.
While making a quick choice in appointing an arbitrator usually without a careful consideration of possible risks of “partiality and dependence” the parties are not aware of an imminent danger they are in. Furthermore, as it is not rarely occurred, while appointing a prospective arbitrator a party often tends to appoint a candidate who will be favorable to him and, at the same time, a party-appointed arbitrator tends to favor its appointing party to “ensure” further appointments. Such a practice may dramatically endanger the effectiveness of the whole arbitration process.
So, undervalue or non-observance of the above principles may lead to either (i) challenge of the arbitrator and/or (ii) in lots of jurisdictions may even lead to the denial in recognition and enforcement or setting aside of the award resulted of the above “favoring” practice.
Therefore, it would be recommended to observe and follow the above arbitration principles and international standards in order to prevent loosing your way in the successful and fair arbitration.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Jean-Louis Delvolvé, Jean Rouche, Gerald H. Pointon, French Arbitration Law and Practice: a dynamic civil law approach to international arbitration. - Kluwer Law International, 2009 – p.p. 97-98 (para. 182) ; Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis, Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration. - Kluwer Law International, 2003 – p. 261 (para. 11-19).
[2] Alan Redfern, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Sweet and Maxwell, 2004. - p. 201 (para. 4-55); J.C. Fernández Rozas, Clearer Ethics Guidelines and Comparative Standards for Arbitrators, Liber Amicorum Bernardo Cremades, Madrid, La Ley, 2010. – p.p. 413-449
[3] Among others, the Act of Ukraine On International Commercial Arbitration;
[4] Article 12 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.
[5] Section 33 of the English Arbitration Act
[6] The 2007 Rules of the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which are based on the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
[7] Article 30 (1) of the Rules of the ICAC at UCCI.
[8] Article 5 (2) of the 1998 Rules of London Court of International Arbitration.
[9] Article 5 (3) of the LCIA Rules (1998).
[10] The new ICC Rules of Arbitration will come into effect since 1 January 2012.
[11] Article 11(1) of the ICC Rules (2012).
[12] Article 2 (5) of the ICC Rules (2012).
[13] Approved on 22 May 2004 by the Council of the International Bar Association (IBA), the world’s leading organization of international legal practitioners.
[14] The IBA Guidelines 2004, Part II, Lists, paras 1-2.
[15] The IBA Guidelines 2004, Part II, Lists, para 3.
[16] The IBA Guidelines 2004, Part II, Lists, para 4.
[17] The IBA Guidelines 2004, Part I, para 6.
[18] Dated 19 March 2010.
[19] The arbitrator was appointed by the law firm-counsel for the respondent on two other occasions within three-year period.
[20] Niklas Lindström, Challenges to Arbitrators - Decisions by the SCC Board during 2008 – 2010 – p.3 // available here
[21] In particular, Paragraph 3.3.7 of the IBA Guidelines (Orange List) provides that more than three appointments of the arbitrator by the same counsel or law firm constitute a relationship between such arbitrator and counsel.
[22] Niklas Lindström, Challenges to Arbitrators - Decisions by the SCC Board during 2008 – 2010 – p. 3
[23] Available here
[24] Approved by the Order of the President of the Chamber of Commerce of Russian Federation No. 39 dated 27 August 2010
The Ukrainian Journal of Business Law, листопад 2011